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Abstract
We investigate the role that public attention plays in determining the effect that campaign con-
tributions funded by interests groups have on legislators’ policy positions. In so doing, we exploit
the Internet service blackout of January 2012 as a quasi-experiment in which a shock increases the
salience of the SOPA/PIPA bills aimed at securing stronger protection of property rights on the In-
ternet. Using a newly compiled dataset of U.S. congressmen’s public statements, which capture their
positions throughout the debate, we find an initially strong statistical relationship between campaign
contributions funded by the affected industries and legislators’ positions. However, this relationship
evaporates once the two bills become primary policy issues. The evidence presented is in line with
the theoretical notion that legislators choose positions on secondary policy issues in order to cater to
organized interests, whereas positions on primary policy issues are driven by electoral support.
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Introduction
Legislative policy choices can be understood as outcomes of collective decision-making based on individual
legislators’ policy positions. These positions may be rather malleable and only partly revealed in public
statements. While interest groups are concerned about legislators’ positions on certain issues and therefore
try to influence them, the salience of these issues for the electorate may differ widely. Some issues receive
a great deal of attention and will rouse large numbers of the electorate, while other issues will slip
voters’ attention. These differences in salience across policy issues create incentives for politicians who
are interested in re-election. Where highly salient primary policy issues are at stake, politicians are
expected to choose a policy stance that follows voter preferences. However, where secondary policy issues
are concerned, politicians may prefer to cater to interest groups in exchange for campaign finance and
therefore support the policy options that are favored by their donors.
In this paper, we want to gain a better understanding of this trade-off and investigate how legislators
choose and reveal policy positions. The question is thus about the role of money, i.e., financial support
from interest groups, in the (non-)choice of policy positions. Specifically, we ask whether the role of
money differs if a policy issue is publicly more or less salient. Any empirical testing faces several chal-
lenges, however. First, there is an endogeneity problem, as the salience of an issue is likely to depend on
its content. Issues that citizens consider important receive more attention, and, at the same time, legis-
lators care more about their constituents’ preferences. Second, there is a risk of tautological reasoning.
If campaign finances predict policy positions, one cannot conclude that the underlying issues are neces-
sarily secondary ones. Third, data limitations may prevent a rigorous analysis, as the researcher must
simultaneously obtain information about the policy positions of politicians as well as about campaign
finances and the public attention given to an issue.
For the present investigation, we draw on the fluctuations in support for and opposition against
the so-called SOPA/PIPA bills in the 112th U.S. Congress as a case in point. It gives us a unique
opportunity to learn about the effect of public attention on the influence of campaign finance. The
Protect IP Act (S. 968; PIPA), which was introduced in the U.S. Senate on May 12, 2011, and its
counterpart, the Stop Online Piracy Act (H.R. 3261; SOPA), which was introduced in the U.S. House on
October 26, 2011, proposed extending the power of law enforcement in order to combat online copyright
infringement and online trafficking in counterfeit goods.1 Both bills were strongly favored by the music
1 The SOPA and PIPA bills are essentially the same. PIPA is sometimes considered to be slightly less restrictive than
SOPA. This is in particular due to the fact that PIPA does not include a provision that would potentially force Internet
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and motion picture industries, which expected a stricter protection of their intellectual property and
thus potentially higher revenues. The Internet industry, on the other hand, would face financial losses
if these bills were passed. The bills offered several new ways to penalize website providers with fines or
even force them to shut down for making content available that was free up to then. Initially, the public
debate about the SOPA/PIPA bills was rather low key and involved primarily people from companies
in information technology. However, a drastic change occurred on January 18, 2012, when an online
protest was orchestrated involving inter alia Reddit and the English-language Wikipedia. Many popular
Internet sites and several thousand other smaller websites participated in a temporary service blackout.
This triggered a huge public debate and reflected widespread opposition in the population.2
We exploit this service blackout as a quasi-experiment, and consider the dramatic change in attention
and the outstanding success that the blackout achieved in mobilizing citizens as an exogenous event.
While the attention was, of course, part of an opposition campaign, nobody probably expected such a
leap in public attention. The SOPA/PIPA bills thus changed unexpectedly from being a secondary policy
issue to being a primary policy issue. This allows us to study the relationship between campaign finances
and politicians’ policy positions for one and the same issue under low and high public attention.
As a foundation for our empirical analysis, we compile a dataset of legislators’ public statements on
SOPA/PIPA, covering the debate since the introduction of the COICA bill3 to the official postponement
of the SOPA and the PIPA bills in January 2012. We then relate the public statements to information
on campaign support from interest groups and the politicians’ characteristics.
We find that during the period following the introduction of the SOPA/PIPA bills, only a few legis-
lators took a clear stand against the issue, while several legislators’ publicly supported the bills. More
interestingly, campaign contributions from the copyright industry (predominantly the film, TV, and music
industry) and the Internet/computer industry (or short tech company), when aggregated at the individual
search engines to remove certain hyperlinks from their search index. Such a provision is, however, part of the SOPA bill
(see H.R. 3261 IH, Sec. 102, pg. 15, paragraph (B)). Yet, SOPA might be less prone to frivolous lawsuits, as it contains a
provision that allows counter-claims for damages if the provider of a notification “knowingly materially misrepresents [...]
that a site is an Internet site dedicated to theft of U.S. property [...]” (H.R. 3261 IS, Sec. 103, pg. 34, paragraph (5)). As
PIPA does not include such a provision, it might incentivize rogue interests to strategically provide notifications on websites
in order to put them out of business. Under this latter aspect, PIPA could be seen as a more extreme measure to protect
intellectual property than SOPA.
2 While the SOPA bill was immediately discussed in some well-known media outlets upon its introduction to the U.S.
House in January 2011 (see, e.g., Kang 2011), wide-scale public attention to the issue only occurred during and after the
service blackout in January 2012 (before any formal vote in Congress took place). As a direct reaction to the service
blackout, for example, over 4 million people are reported to have signed Google’s online petition to the U.S. Congress in
protest against the proposed bill and during the peak of the protest, around 2,000 U.S. citizens per second were trying to
call their local representative in Congress (Wortham 2012).
3 The Combating Online Infringement and Counterfeits Act (COICA) was the predecessor bill of PIPA and was not
further considered in the legislative process after 2010 (see Library of Congress 2010).
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level, are a strong predictor of a legislator’s stance on the issue, over and above his or her party affiliation.
Before the Internet service blackout, the probability of observing a legislator’s public statement in support
of a stricter law against online copyright infringement increases, ceteris paribus, by around 6 percentage
points if he or she received about USD 30,000 (one standard deviation) more campaign contributions
from the copyright industry than from the tech industry. However, the significant statistical relationship
between campaign contributions and the legislator’s stated stances on the SOPA/PIPA bills evaporates
almost completely after the sharp rise in public attention on the policy issue in response to the Internet
service blackout.
This paper is related to several strands of research. First, it contributes to the politico-economic
literature on money in politics that investigates how campaign contributions of interest groups influence
legislators’ policy positions (see, for example, Austen-Smith 1995, Grossman and Helpman 1994, and
Kau et al. 1982 for theoretical considerations, Herndon 1982, Powell and Grimmer 2016, Schroedel 1986,
Stratmann 1991, and Stratmann 2002 for empirical evidence, as well as Ansolabehere et al. 2003 and
Stratmann 2005 for reviews of the literature). Second, this study relates to the literature on attention in
politics (see Jones and Baumgartner 2004 for the legislative’s focus on primary policy issues and Jones
and Keiser 1987 for attention and campaign donations), as well as the recent contributions discussing
secondary policy issues as a relevant factor in incumbents’ re-elections (Bouton et al., 2014; List and
Sturm, 2006). Third, our contribution is more specifically related to the law, political science, and
communication studies literature discussing Internet governance, public opinion and lobbying in the
context of the SOPA/PIPA bills (see, e.g., Benkler et al. 2015, Guo 2013, Lemley et al. 2011, and Powell
2013).
Theoretical framework
Positive analyses of the political process have a long tradition in research that seeks to understand which
policies legislators support. Closely related to this enquiry is the question about the role that money
plays in determining politicians’ choices of policy positions. In particular, research needs to identify what
factors determine the role played by campaign contributions in affecting the stances that politicians hold
on a specific issue or bill.
We define legislators as being characterized by their history (past policy positions, long-term exchange
relationship with their sponsors) and as being primarily office motivated. They are reliant on electoral
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support, which in turn depends on their policy positions, as well as the campaign-financing money they
have available. Clearly, the amount of campaign finance supplied by interest groups (IG) will also depend
on a legislator’s policy position.4 Accordingly, a legislator can adopt a policy position that boosts his
or her financial campaign support from IGs. Alternatively, she or he can approve or disapprove a policy
so as to gain voter support directly. The support and acclaim that a legislator receives depends on how
well informed the electorate is about the legislator’s position and on how much it cares about the policy
issue. Moreover, a legislator can always abstain from taking a stand in order to maintain the option to
opportunistically choose a position that maximizes payoffs. Finally, a legislator might also change his or
her policy position if expected payoffs can be increased. Given these considerations, we try to characterize
the main trade-off as simply as possible.
Probabilistic choice of policy positions
We minimally formalize our theoretical framework with a probabilistic choice calculus in which legislators
choose to publicly take up a stance on policy issues in order to maximize their chances of re-election. In
the simplest possible case, legislators face four options. They can announce that they will stick to the
status quo (alternative 1), they can state that they support a proposed policy change/bill (alternative
2), they can take a neutral stance (alternative 3), or not take a public stance at all (alternative 0). We
assume that some policy issue/bill debated in Congress is one-dimensional and affects two IGs in such
a way that one favors the bill and the other opposes it. Call these IG’s A and B. Similarly, there is a
segment of voters who would be positively affected by the adoption of the bill (voters A), while others
(voters B) would lose. Legislators choose a strategy j out of the discrete set of alternatives.5 Each of
the possible stances on the issue can be more or less in line with what the two affected IGs as well as the
two groups of voters A and B favor. Importantly, given that a conflict of interests is assumed, a position
in favor of or against a policy proposal must be in line with what one IG and one group of voters wants,
but in opposition to what the other IG and group of voters want. Hence, each substantive position j,
i.e., alternatives 1 and 2, must be closer either to IG and voter group A or to IG and voter group B.
Legislators primarily derive utility from being in office and thus maximize their utility by acting in
such a way that their chances of re-election are maximized. The chances of re-election are determined
4 The literature on campaign finance suggests that it is very difficult to empirically separate the channel running from
policy position to campaign support from that running from campaign support to the choice of policy position (see, e.g.,
Bronars and Lott 1997 and Stratmann 2002).
5 Note that our theoretical framework is fairly general. The same theoretical rationale can be applied in order to model
decisions in roll call votes or legislators’ public statements on any political issue.
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directly by how close a legislator’s policy position is to that preferred by the constituents and indirectly
by campaign contributions from IGs, which are instrumental to electoral success. There are thus two
sources of electoral support, and legislators maximize the net support they can gain from taking a stand
either by favoring the status quo or by advocating the change in the law relative to not committing to
either substantive alternative. If support of either policy position generates a net loss in electoral support,
the legislator will not take a stand.
We choose as IG A and as voter group A, the ones that are closer to alternative 1. Accordingly,
alternative 2 is more attractive for IG B and voter group B. The calculus for legislator i to opt for
alternative 1, i.e., the status quo, thus depends on the expected increase in campaign support from IG A
ci1A (relative to not taking a stance) minus the expected decrease in support from IG B ci1B. The latter
may well be zero. If we assume a common multiplier that allows campaign money to be transformed into
electoral support, we obtain the first component of the net electoral support from supporting position
1, i.e., β(ci1A − ci1B). Similarly, legislator i expects to win additional votes vi1A from group A and to
lose votes vi1B from group B. However, whether these vote gains and losses materialize depends on the
salience of the issue. Factor ρ stands for the probability that a voter is aware of the issue (i.e., the
degree of public attention). The second component thus amounts to ρ(vi1A − vi1B). Finally, we add the
opportunity costs of oij related to making a public statement on the issue (i.e., the time a legislator i
could spend on dealing with other policy issues and win votes). The same considerations hold for policy
alternative 2 with the opposite sign. A legislator i can thus assess the net electoral support that positions
j = 0, 1, 2, 3 yield as
Sij = β(cijA − cijB) + ρ(vijA − vijB)− oij j = 0, 1, 2, 3
= β∆cij + ρ∆vij − oij .
(1)
If β 6= 0 and ρ 6= 0, legislators must thus trade off the differential of the money flows from the
IG opposing the issue and the IG supporting it, and the differential in electoral support from voters
opposing and those supporting the issue, respectively. As ∆cij and ∆vij refer to the same alternative
j, a legislator’s decision to optimize electoral support by making a public statement aimed at increasing
∆cij will also affect ∆vij . However, in the case of no public attention (ρ = 0), the legislator’s choice of
policy position is solely determined by the interests of campaign donors who will potentially be affected
by the bill (as opportunity costs of oij are the same for making any public statement).
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From the electoral support function, we can derive a function of a legislators perceived re-election
chances R∗ij depending on differential money flows, voters position and voters attention on the issue. The
most simple calculus emerges in the case of a general penalty (or reward) for adopting position j (i.e.
∆vj = constant) in the situation with full public attention (ρ = 1). In addition to the main effect of
campaign donations (in the situation with no public attention), there is a general effect of public attention
ρ∆vj summarized by the (indicator) variable paj as well as an interaction effect between public attention
and campaign donations. The latter term captures that the strategy has changed towards some given
money flows. Hence, we can specify the impact of a legislator’s choice of position j on his or her perceived
re-election chances R∗ij as a function of ∆cij dependent on public attention paj such that:
R∗ij = αj + βj∆cij + γjpaj + δjpaj∆cij j = 0, 1, 2, 3 (2)
where αj is a constant, capturing the baseline impact of j. Given this theoretical framework, we
can derive hypotheses about the legislator’s choices regarding his or her policy stance. Consider the two
extreme cases: (a) a secondary policy issue (paj = 0), and (b) a highly salient policy issue, i.e., a primary
policy issue (paj = 1). In the former case, as stated above, a legislator’s choice of policy position is solely
determined by the interests of campaign donors who will potentially be affected by the bill. In the latter
case, the attractiveness of an alternative j also depends on the electorate’s stance on the issue. If, for
example, j were in line with the majority of voters, δjpaj∆cij would be negative and would have to be
more than compensated for by β∆cij in order to make j an attractive alternative. Hence, j would have
to be a position that is clearly in line with what one of the IGs strongly favors and is willing to reward.
Hypotheses
From the outlined theoretical framework, we derive the following two hypotheses:
H1: A legislator’s public stance on a secondary policy issue is oriented towards the position of the affected
IG to which he or she maintains the strongest exchange relationship (i.e., the more the legislator relies
on campaign contributions from the IG in question relative to other IGs).
H2: The higher the public attention/salience of an issue, the lower the impact of IGs on a legislator’s
position, and the closer his or her position is to the preferences of the constituents.
Importantly, our hypotheses do not state that IGs do not have any influence on legislator’s positions
under high public attention. They simply state that such influence diminishes with increasing public
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attention.
Empirical strategy
Baseline empirical model
Based on the theoretical framework, we derive our baseline empirical model in order to test the hypothe-
ses in the context of the SOPA/PIPA bills. First, we extend Equation 2 with a set of L additional
variables that are potentially correlated with campaign contributions as well as R∗ij in order to account
for confounding factors that might bias the estimation of the model coefficients.
R∗ij = αj + βj∆cij + γjpaj + δjpaj∆cij +
L∑
l=1
θljxil, (3)
Second, we add a random component εj to the impact R
∗
ij of position j on a legislator’s perceived
re-election chances. A legislator i’s expected chance of re-election derived from the jth choice is then
Rij = R
∗
ij + εj . As legislators are assumed to be predominantly office-motivated, utility maximization
dictates that legislator i chooses the alternative j if Rij > Rik (j, k = 0, 1, 2, 3) for all k 6= j. By means of
the random component εj , we can then express the probability of observing legislator i choosing position
j as
P (yi = j) = P (Rik −Rij ≤ 0, for all k 6= j)
= P (R∗ij −R∗ik ≥ εk − εj , for all k 6= j),
(4)
and insert (3) into (4). Under the assumption of all εij being independent and type 1 extreme value
distributed, it can be shown that this yields a multinomial logit model (MNL) of the form
pij = P (yi = j) =
eαj+βj∆cij+γjpaj+δjpaj∆cij+
∑L
l=1 θljxil∑3
k=0 e
αk+βk∆cik+γkpak+δkpak∆cik+
∑L
l=1 θlkxil
. (5)
where pij is the probability that legislator i chooses position j, yi is legislator i’s stated position, βj
is the baseline effect of campaign contributions (i.e., the effect if a secondary policy issue is considered)
on the probability of observing i to choose j, and δj the differential effect of the campaign contributions
if the issue gains public attention.6
6 The derivation of logit models from models of probabilistic choice goes back to Luce (1959). See, for example, McFadden
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Identification
The proper estimation of the empirical model, i.e., identifying the impact of public attention on the
relevance of strong financial ties to IGs for legislators’ policy positions, poses some challenges. Consider,
for example, the case of a set of bills that gain either high public attention or low public attention, and
we want to test Model (5) on the basis of roll call data or stated policy positions. It would be tricky to
distinguish any effect of public attention from the effect of the actual policy content of a bill if different
policy issues systematically gain either high or low public attention. Hence, we cannot properly test our
hypotheses if public attention does not vary for one and the same policy issue (or randomly across issues).
An ideal setting would thus involve an experiment in which legislators state their positions on the same
policy issue once when salience is high, and once when it is low.
We argue that the temporary shutdown of several Internet services on January 18, 2012 in protest
against the stricter control of property rights on the Internet, as envisaged by the so-called SOPA/PIPA
bills in the United States, approximates such a setting and can serve as a quasi-experiment.7 While the
campaign was certainly meant to lobby the users and was a strategic decision of the opponents of the
two bills, the stark increase in public attention it created came as a surprise. The success of the action
message can thus be regarded as an unanticipated shock in public attention for the Members of Congress.
It made an issue that previously harldy got any public attention suddenly highly salient to the voters.
Analyzing congressmens’ public statements in the context of the SOPA/PIPA bills and the related Internet
service blackout thus provides a particularly promising scenario for testing our hypotheses. Moreover, the
SOPA/PIPA bills involve highly relevant content in terms of economic policy and Internet governance.
Its consequences would have potentially affected a large number of U.S. residents. Many of them were
only aware of the SOPA/PIPA bills after the orchestrated Internet service blackout.
On January 18, 2012, Wikipedia, Google, and several thousand smaller websites participated in a
vast online protest against the SOPA/PIPA bills. While Wikipedia and other websites actually blacked
out their services on their webpage, Google and other websites conspicuously posted their opposition
on their home pages and motivated visitors to join the protest against SOPA/PIPA. In the case of the
English-language Wikipedia page, this meant that visitors were not able to search the online encyclopedia,
(1981) for a general discussion as well as Cameron and Trivedi (2005) for a complete derivation of logit from choice models
with type 1 extreme value distributed random components.
7 An alternative way to empirically separate the role of public attention from the underlying policy content might exploit
accidents and natural catastrophes as exogenous shocks to the salience of certain environmental policies. However, such
events might affect the political agenda as well as several industries in various ways. Hence, any effect might be difficult
to attribute solely to the change in public attention. In particular, such an event could shift risk perception rather than
public attention.
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but were instead confronted with a banner informing visitors about potential negative consequences of
SOPA/PIPA. Figure 1 shows the Wikipedia blackout screen.
Figure 1: The English-language Wikipedia page during the service blackout on January 18, 2012
Data source: Wikipedia (http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Wikipedia_Blackout_Screen.jpg)
The campaign reached many U.S. citizens within hours and generated an immense resonance on
Internet portals as well as in other media.8 With the onset of the Internet service blackout, Internet
search patterns within the United States show a sharp increase in inquiries related to the SOPA/PIPA
bills. The number of queries of the terms “pipa” and “sopa” vis-a`-vis terms refering to other well know
bills debated in Congress during the same Congress is displayed in Figure A6 in the Appendix. The
figure indicates that SOPA/PIPA related search interest not only peaked during the time of the Internet
service blackout, but was also very low during 2011 when the respective bills were discussed in Congress.
Relative to the search volume related to SOPA, none of the terms related to other major bills have a
similar magnitude of search volume at any point during the 112th U.S. Congress.
The orchestrated blackout not only strongly increased public attention to the bills, it also provoked
reactions by the electorate. As mentioned above, as a direct consequence of the orchestrated service
blackout, according to some estimates, about 2,000 call attempts per second were made by U.S. citizens
during the peak of the protest, trying to contact their local representative in Washington D.C. (Wortham
8 According to Wikipedia about 160 million people saw their protest message that day, not counting the visitors to other
protesting sites (Waugh and Poulter 2012). ? report a massive online mobilization following the days of the blackout,
reflected in over 3000 stories surrounding the SOPA/PIPA bills and emerging during the week of the blackout.
10
2012). In addition to phone calls, over 400,000 Emails were sent in protest of the bills (FFTF 2012).
According to Wortham (2012) over 4 million people signed Google’s online petition to the U.S. Congress
in protest against the proposed bills as a direct reaction to the Internet blackout. Moreover, 10 million
people are reported to have signed petitions against SOPA organized by Free Press, Don’t Censor the
Net, Avaaz, Credo, and MoveOn (FFTF 2012). Overall, the reactions clearly reflected the opposition of
large parts of the citizenry to the two bills.
We present our empirical results step by step. First, we document the statistical relationship between
specific campaign contributions and the legislator’s stances on SOPA/PIPA. Our two main hypotheses
derived in Section are then tested with estimates of Model (5). Finally, robustness checks of our main
results.
Coefficients of interaction terms are generally difficult to interpret in the case of non-linear regression
models and the t-tests of individual coefficients are not sufficient to test the hypotheses for interaction
effects. We therefore compute discrete effects for typical observations. The effects (and their respective
confidence intervals) are computed with the method suggested by Fox and Hong (2009). Based on the
estimated coefficients, we predict probabilities for choosing either alternative dependent on different levels
of the campaign contribution differential while keeping all other covariates fixed at typical values.9 In
order not to overstate the computed effects, we only present effects based on the actual range of campaign
contributions observed in our dataset.
Data
For our analysis, we compile and code a dataset with legislators’ recorded public statements on the
SOPA/PIPA bills. We link the legislators’ statements with data on their political background (years in
office and party affiliation), their personal background (gender and age), as well as detailed micro-data
on specific campaign contributions received by them. The following subsections introduce the various
data sources and explain the coding of the main variables.
Public statements on the SOPA/PIPA bills
The dataset covers the political debate from September 2010, i.e., the introduction of a preliminary version
of the PIPA bill to the U.S. Senate, to the end of February 2012, i.e., a few weeks after the postponement
9 Continuous variables are fixed at their sample means and binary or ordinal variables at their proportional distribution
in the sample.
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of the SOPA and the PIPA bills in January 2012. The data compilation and coding is conducted in five
steps. First, we assemble a baseline sample of recorded statements from two independent secondary data
sources which collected statements on SOPA/PIPA during the debate: ProPublica10, and the Sunlight
Foundation’s OpenCongress platform11. For purposes of verification, these secondary data sources provide
a primary data source (i.e., a radio interview, a newspaper article, or a tweet) for each of the recorded
statements. In addition, ProPublica and OpenCongress also label each statement with the respective
legislator’s stance on the issue (pro/contra the bill). We extend the set of records by directly searching
for additional statements in primary sources (including media outlets, the legislator’s official webpages,
and social media).12 We find 97 statements not included in any of the secondary sources.13 Second, given
the baseline dataset of recorded statements, we remove overlapping records. Third, we assign each of the
statements to one of three categories (in a first step ignoring the categorization provided by ProPublica
and OpenCongress):
1. The legislator stated being in favor of the bill.
2. The legislator stated being against the bill.
3. The legislator stated being undecided.14
Fourth, we compare our coding to the categorization provided by the secondary data sources (ProPub-
lica and OpenCongress) and carefully reconsider all divergent cases. The categorization by ProPublica
diverges in 70 cases as this organization uses an additional category “leaning no”. In our coding, these
statements are coded as either “undecided”, or “against”, respectively.15 Finally, for all legislators where
no recorded statement was available before and/or after the service blackout, we added an entry “no
opinion recorded”. Thus, we end up with a dataset in which each member serving in the 112th Congress
10 ProPublica is an independent, non-profit news outlet that specializes in investigative journalism (see http://www.
propublica.org/about/). ProPublica staff followed the SOPA/PIPA debate since the introduction of the bills and recorded
legislators’ public statements from various primary sources. The collected data is publicly available on http://projects.
propublica.org/sopa/timeline.html.
11 The Sunlight Foundation is a non-partisan, non-profit organization that promotes open government by providing data
on various aspects of local, state, and federal U.S. politics via several web services (http://sunlightfoundation.com/
about). Its OpenCongress web platform (www.opencongress.org) provides detailed information on the legislative process
in the U.S. Congress.
12 Importantly, in order to avoid a bias being introduced by the data compilation process, we exerted the same amount
of effort when searching for statements for each legislator (i.e., we did not search longer or in different media in cases where
no statement was found).
13 However, 23 of these statements are, in terms of content, almost identical with statements made by the same legislator
and captured in one of the secondary sources (based on an alternative primary source). These 23 statements are thus
considered duplicates and are not used in the analyses of this study.
14 Section A.I in the Appendix gives more details and examples of how the data was compiled and coded.
15 Of the remaining statements, we encountered 41 divergent cases. Table A2 in the Appendix presents an overview of
all coding differences.
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is assigned at least one entry before the service blackout and one entry after the service blackout. Our
data preparation procedure thus generates a balanced panel consisting of all Members of Congress (except
for Delegates and one vacant seat in the U.S. House).16
Table 1 provides an overview of the number of statements assigned to each category before and after
the service blackout, as well as the respective count of legislators involved. The table shows that the total
number of recorded statements is rather balanced across the two periods before and after the Internet
blackout. It also becomes apparent that the majority of public statements in favor of the SOPA/PIPA
bills were made before the service blackout, whereas the majority of statements against the bills were
made afterwards.
Table 1: Count of legislators’ and statements on SOPA/PIPA before and after the Internet service blackout
Before After
Public statements in favor 163 6
(No. of legislators involved) (82) (6)
- final stated stance 69 3
Public statements against 93 240
(No. of legislators involved) (51) (208)
- final stated stance 48 205
Public statements undecided 45 51
(No. of legislators involved) (39) (45)
- final stated stance 30 43
No. of legislators making no public statements 387 283
Total no. of recorded statements 301 297
Total no. of legislators 534 534
Note: Of the 69 legislators who made a public statement in favor, 21 legislators changed their position to against.
Data sources: See Section and Section A.I in the Appendix.
The timing of the public statements in the SOPA/PIPA debate is illustrated in Figure 2. The
statements are rather broadly spread over the period when the SOPA/PIPA bills were barely publicly
discussed. However, when the issue suddenly received much greater public attention in response to
the Internet service blackout, the number of public statements (mostly against SOPA/PIPA) increased
sharply. Figure 2 indicates clearly how effective the sudden public attention was in obliging legislators to
communicate their position on the issue.
16 In total, the panel includes 534 Members of Congress and 502 individual statements in favor of or against the bills and
96 entries for “undecided”. The difference to the official number of 535 voting members in the U.S. Congress is explained by
a temporarily vacant seat in the 112th U.S. House. Representative David Wu (Democrat, Oregon) resigned in August 2011.
His seat was later taken by Suzanne Bonamici who joined the U.S. House in February 2012 (see the official list of vacancies
and successors of the 112th U.S. Congress under http://history.house.gov/Institution/Vacancies-Successors/112/).
Thus, neither Representative was in office throughout the SOPA/PIPA debate and particularly not during the Internet
service blackout and are therefore excluded from the analysis.
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Figure 2: Number of stated stances of Members of the U.S. Congress on the SOPA/PIPA bills over time
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18, 2012.
Data sources: Own compilation based on various sources. See Section and Section A.I in the Appendix for details.
Remarkably, several legislators switched with regard to their stance on Internet governance from
supporting the SOPA bill to opposing it (or at least ceasing to support it) as the first row indicates.
None of the legislators switched sides in the other direction. Figure A1 in the Appendix shows the count
of Members of Congress’ taking either position before and after the Internet blackout.
Campaign contributions
Finance data on campaign contributions come from the Center for Responsive Politics (CRP) and were
collected via the Sunlight Foundation’s Influence Explorer database.17 All campaign contribution records
indicate the industry with which the respective contributor is affiliated. We focus on contributions
from two main industry categories: “TV/MOVIES/MUSIC” for the copyright industry and “COMPUT-
ERS/INTERNET” for the tech industry. Contributions by these two industries are very similar in terms
of magnitude and follow similar patterns over time. The monthly average total campaign contributions
to Members of Congress by either of these two industries is around one million USD (see Figure A2 in
17 The full raw dataset is available under http://data.influenceexplorer.com/bulk/. Specific parts of the database
can be queried via the Influence Explorer API (https://sunlightlabs.github.io/datacommons/).
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the Appendix for details). The two industries thus seem to be similarly engaged in donating money to
members of the U.S. Congress.
For our main analyses, we compute the total amount of campaign contributions donated by each
of the two industries to each legislator over the year before the Internet service blackout. Our main
explanatory variable, in line with our theoretical considerations, is the difference between these two sums
(∆cij ≡ ∆Contributions (USD 1,000), i.e., the total campaign contributions by the copyright industry
minus total campaign contributions by the tech industry in USD 1,000).
Legislators’ political and personal background
Some individual characteristics of the Members of Congress in the sample serve as control variables.
Data on the political and personal background of legislators are derived from the Library of Congress.
These characteristics include the number of years served in Congress (Years served), party affiliation (an
indicator variable that is equal to 1 if the legislator is Republican, and equal to 0 otherwise), Age, and
gender (an indicator variable that is equal to 1 if the legislator is Male). Table A3 in the Appendix shows
some descriptive statistics for the variable campaign contributions as well as the legislators’ characteristics.
The biggest surplus in contributions from the copyright industry amounts to USD 275,000 in the year
prior to the blackout. The respective amount for the tech industry amounts to USD 429,000. On average,
the difference is about USD 3,600. 54% of the Members of Congress are Republicans. The mean age is
58 years. They have served, on average, about 12 years. The proportion of men is 83%.
Results
We present the results of our empirical analyses in three steps. First, we document the statistical
relationship between campaign contributions and legislators’ stances on SOPA/PIPA. Second, we test our
two main hypotheses with estimates of the multinomial logit model (5). Third, we present complementary
analyses to test whether our results are robust.
The statistical relationship between campaign finance and legislators’ positions
Our descriptive analyses document the statistical relationship between campaign contributions from the
tech industry and the copyright industry, and the legislators’ publicly stated opinions on the issue.
Figure 3 presents the aggregate surplus of copyright-industry campaign contributions (copyright minus
15
tech contributions) per month over the period from one year before the service blackout to one year
after the service blackout. One time series is plotted for legislators whose last stance before the service
blackout was in favor of SOPA/PIPA and one is for those whose last stance before the service blackout
was against SOPA/PIPA. Strikingly, the supporters of the bills receive systematically more campaign
contributions from the copyright industry than from the tech industry (mean difference t-value: -10.533).
This is particularly the case for the time before the Internet service blackout.18
Figure 3: Campaign finance contributions to supporters and opponents of SOPA/PIPA
Internet service blackout
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the period of one year before the Internet service blackout until one year after the Internet service blackout. One
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Data sources: Center for Responsive Politics/OpenSecrets.org, Sunlight Foundation, and ProPublica (see Sec-
tion and Section A.I in the Appendix for details).
Based on a simple linear regression analysis, we further study the correlation between campaign
contributions from the two primarily affected industries and legislators’ positions. In particular, we
estimate the probability of observing a statement in favor of SOPA/PIPA (vs. against, undecided or
no statement) before the service blackout as well as the probability of observing a statement against
SOPA/PIPA (vs. in favor, undecided or no statement) before the service blackout as a function of the
campaign contributions a legislator received and additional factors, most importantly his or her party
affiliation. While we pool the data from both chambers, we include an indicator variable for Senators
18 Figures A3 and A4 in the Appendix further illustrate this point.
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to control for differences between the two chambers (as well as potentially relevant differneces between
SOPA and PIPA). Table 2 presents the results.
Table 2: OLS estimates of stated stances on SOPA/PIPA before the Internet service blackout
Dependent variable:
Stance in favor of SOPA/PIPA = 1 Stance against SOPA/PIPA = 1
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
∆ Contributions (USD 1,000) 0.003∗∗∗ 0.002∗∗ 0.002∗∗ −0.002∗∗∗ −0.002∗∗∗ −0.002∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004)
Republican −0.024 −0.038 −0.047∗ −0.033
(0.029) (0.029) (0.025) (0.025)
Male −0.012 0.006 −0.025 −0.009
(0.036) (0.034) (0.034) (0.034)
Age 0.002 0.001 −0.002 −0.002
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Years served −0.002 −0.0003 0.001 0.0004
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Senator (PIPA) 0.289∗∗∗ 0.317∗∗∗ 0.079∗∗ 0.103∗∗∗
(0.049) (0.045) (0.038) (0.040)
Constant 0.120∗∗∗ 0.003 −0.266∗∗ 0.097∗∗∗ 0.249∗∗∗ 0.084
(0.014) (0.088) (0.118) (0.013) (0.087) (0.094)
State fixed effects No No Yes No No Yes
Observations 534 534 534 534 534 534
Adjusted R2 0.055 0.173 0.218 0.051 0.062 0.076
Residual Std. Error 0.326 0.305 0.297 0.279 0.277 0.275
F Statistic 32.150∗∗∗ 19.643∗∗∗ 3.699∗∗∗ 29.448∗∗∗ 6.827∗∗∗ 1.794∗∗∗
Notes: The difference in contributions is computed by subtracting the total amount of contributions a legislator
received from the tech industry over a period of one year prior to the Internet service blackout from the total
amount received from the copyright industry over the same period of time. The dependent variable considers the
last opinion recorded before the Internet service blackout. The reference group includes legislators who stated
an opposite stance, were indifferent, or did not make any public statement before the Internet service blackout.
Heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors are presented in parentheses. The statistical significance of regression
coefficients is indicated with * 0.1 > p > 0.05, ** 0.05 > p > 0.01, and *** p < 0.001.
Data sources: See Section Section A.I in the Appendix for details.
The estimated partial correlations show that the previously illustrated relationship between specific
campaign contributions and legislators’ stances on SOPA/PIPA - when there was limited attention on the
issue - hold ceteris paribus. The coefficient of the difference in contributions in specification (2) indicates
that an increase of one standard deviation (around USD 30,000) in the surplus of contributions received
from the copyright industry increases the probability of observing a legislator making statements in favor
of SOPA/PIPA by around 6 percentage points (31.286× 0.002× 100). The opposite holds for statements
against SOPA/PIPA in column (5). In columns (3) and (6), we additionally control for state-fixed effects.
These specifications thus take into account unobserved factors, such as industry structure, that might be
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correlated both with campaign contributions from specific industries as well as with specific preferences
for policies on Internet governance. The findings hold.
Hypotheses tests
We test our hypotheses by estimating Model (5) with our panel data set containing an observation for
each Member of Congress before and after the Internet blackout. Table 3 shows the results from our
baseline multinomial logit (MNL) model. The coefficients of the covariates regressed on the alternative
“no opinion recorded” are normalized to 0 and are not presented in the table. The results can thus be
interpreted relative to this reference category. The first specification (columns 1 to 3) only includes the
variables capturing campaign finances. Columns 4 to 6 show the results of our preferred specification
derived from our theoretical framework including the Senator-indicator and further control variables.
Table 3: MNL estimates of stated stances on SOPA/PIPA before/after the Internet service blackout
Dependent variable:
Undecided Against In favor Undecided Against In favor
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
∆ Contributions (USD 1,000) 0.006 −0.038∗∗∗ 0.028∗∗∗ 0.006 −0.039∗∗∗ 0.022∗∗
(0.005) (0.003) (0.009) (0.006) (0.003) (0.010)
After 0.699∗∗ 1.871∗∗∗ −2.633∗∗∗ 0.583∗∗ 1.886∗∗∗ −2.764∗∗∗
(0.279) (0.178) (0.299) (0.281) (0.183) (0.323)
∆ Contributions (USD 1,000) x after −0.008 0.039∗∗∗ −0.019∗∗ −0.010 0.038∗∗∗ −0.019∗
(0.008) (0.006) (0.010) (0.009) (0.006) (0.011)
Republican 0.175 −0.170 −0.320
(0.297) (0.195) (0.336)
Male −0.762∗∗ 0.100 −0.132
(0.373) (0.248) (0.414)
Age 0.031∗ −0.016 0.018
(0.018) (0.012) (0.020)
Years served 0.009 −0.010 −0.014
(0.019) (0.013) (0.022)
Senator (PIPA) 2.128∗∗∗ 0.960∗∗∗ 2.417∗∗∗
(0.387) (0.259) (0.463)
Constant −2.580∗∗∗ −2.198∗∗∗ −1.985∗∗∗ −4.599∗∗∗ −1.308∗∗ −3.220∗∗∗
(0.196) (0.123) (0.219) (1.012) (0.652) (1.104)
N 1068 1068 1068 1068 1068 1068
Akaike Inf. Crit. 1,897.123 1,897.123 1,897.123 1,773.751 1,773.751 1,773.751
Notes: The difference in contributions is computed by subtracting the total amount of contributions that a legislator
received from the tech industry over a period of one year prior to the Internet service blackout from the total amount
received from the copyright industry over the same period of time. The sample contains two observations per
member of Congress, i.e., the last recorded opinions before and after the Internet service blackout. The alternative
‘no opinion recorded’ serves as the reference category (the respective coefficients are normalized to 0, and are
not shown in the table). Standard errors are presented in parentheses. The statistical significance of regression
coefficients is indicated with * 0.1 > p > 0.05, ** 0.05 > p > 0.01, and *** p < 0.001.
Data sources: Own compilation from various sources. See Section and Section A.I in the Appendix for details.
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For both specifications, the results indicate that before the service blackout, the probability of observ-
ing a statement in favor of SOPA/PIPA is higher than not observing one, the more money a legislator
received from the copyright industry. The opposite is the case for statements against SOPA/PIPA, which
are less likely to be observed before the blackout from legislators who received more from the copyright
industry. The probability of observing neutral statements on SOPA/PIPA before the Internet service
blackout is not statistically significantly related to the difference in campaign contributions from the two
affected industries. These findings are in line with Hypothesis 1, which posits that policy positions on
secondary policy issues are ceteris paribus at least partly driven by financial ties with IGs. The sudden
increase in public attention due to the service blackout has (if neither of the two industries contributes
substantially more) a strong positive effect on the likelihood of observing more neutral statements as well
as more statements against SOPA/PIPA, but a negative effect on the likelihood of observing statements
in favor of SOPA/PIPA (see the second row of estimated coefficients). Overall, there is therefore a move
in legislators’ positions towards the position expressed by many constituents once salience rises.
Figure 4 presents effect plots (taking into account the interaction term in the second specification of
Table 3; see Fox and Hong 2009 for details on the computation of effect plots based on MNL models)
that quantify the economic significance of the shock in public attention on the role of campaign finance
contributions in politicians’ stances. It illustrates the ceteris paribus effect of the difference in campaign
contributions from the two affected industries on the probability of observing a legislator choosing any
of the four alternatives. The plots on the left-hand side show this relationship for the time before the
service blackout, and the ones on the right-hand side for the time after.
The plotted effects present a rather clear picture with respect to the role of campaign contributions
in motivating politicians to take a stance on SOPA/PIPA. In line with the simpler OLS models presented
above, the probability of observing a politician publicly supporting SOPA/PIPA is ceteris paribus sys-
tematically higher, if he or she received more campaign contributions from the copyright industry than
from the tech industry, and vice versa. However, this strong statistical relationship almost completely
disappears once SOPA/PIPA becomes a primary policy issue due to the stark increase in public attention.
In the context of the SOPA/PIPA bills, the empirical finding is thus consistent with Hypothesis 2, which
posits that the influence that financial ties to IGs have on legislators’ positions on a policy issue decreases
with increasing public attention to the issue.
The presented results are robust if the sample is restricted to the legislators who made a public
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Figure 4: Campaign contributions and publicly stated stances before and after the Internet blackout
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Notes: Effect plots based on the estimated multinomial logit model with the interaction term
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lines display a 95-percent confidence interval around the estimated effects.
Data sources: See Section and Section A.I in the Appendix for details.
statement before the Internet service blackout.19
19 The additional results are available on request.
20
Robustness of Results
Additional control for the industry structure in the electoral districts
Campaign contributions from the two industries might capture the industry structure in a legislator’s
electoral district. While this would not invalidate our testing strategy for the theoretical hypotheses, an
interpretation of the statistical regularities in the context of local political markets would be required. In
order to check the scope of the trade-offs involved in the current setting, we take the industry structure
into account and estimate Model (5) with two additional explanatory variables as well as their interaction
with the Internet blackout indicator. These additional variables capture the fraction of geo-coded type
15 campaign donations by individuals who are employed in either the tech industry or the copyright
industry per electoral district.20
The results (presented in Table A4 in the Appendix) show that the industry structure in the electoral
district has some predictive power for legislators’ stance on the issue. Members of Congress elected in a
district where the copyright industry contributes a higher proportion to employment are more likely to
support SOPA/PIPA before the Internet blackout. The effect of the campaign contributions, however, is
not affected by the extension of the empirical model. Effect computations for typical observations reveal
effects of similar size.21
Separate estimation
The Internet service blackout might have changed not only the role of campaign finances in the choice of
policy positions, but also the role of unobserved factors that are correlated with our covariates. In order
to allow for a flexible specification, we estimate our model once for the period before the Internet service
blackout and once for the period after the Internet service blackout. We thus split the sample instead
of using an interaction term. This addresses the issue of the potential biases that such time-variant
correlations might induce for the interaction term. Moreover, these estimations have the advantage that
the standard errors are not correlated over time, as each legislator is only included with one observation
20 FEC registered type 15 transactions are “contribution[s] to political committees (other than Super PACs and Hybrid
PACs) from an individual, partnership or limited liability company”. In order to code the additional variables, we filter
type 15 transactions for donations made by individual citizens. We then geo-code the donors’ addresses via the Street
Address to Coordinates API (Warden 2013) and map the coordinates of donors to the congressional election districts. The
variables are then computed for each district j as the sum of all donations made by individuals working in the respective
industry (i.e., tech or copyright) over the sum of all donations made by all individuals located in district j. Note that
this measure does not coincide with our main explanatory variable, as it captures the local workforce employed in the
industries of interest that actively donates to political campaigns. It does not capture who received the donations. See
Figure A7 in the Appendix for details on this measure.
21 Effect plots are available on request.
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per sample.
Table A5 in the Appendix presents the results. The results are qualitatively the same as those pre-
sented in the main analysis. We again compute and illustrate the effect of campaign contributions before
and after the service blackout as effect plots. These results are presented in the Appendix, Section A.III
(see Figure A8 for the sample covering the time before the service blackout and Figure A9 for the sample
covering the time after the service blackout, respectively). The estimated coefficients in the second model
should be treated with caution, though, as the minority outcome for the category “in favor” becomes a
rare event due to the splitting of the sample for some alternatives. This renders an exact estimation of
the coefficients difficult.
Relaxation of the independence of irrelevant alternatives assumption
In our baseline model, we assume that the alternative specific random components εj are independent
across alternatives j. This is a common assumption in any standard MNL. However, whether the assump-
tion is problematic depends on the specific data and research question. In our context, the assumption
of the independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA) means that legislators make pairwise comparisons for
all the alternative policy positions, and that for each comparison any characteristics of alternatives other
than the pair under consideration do not matter. Thus, the choice between making a statement in favor
of SOPA/PIPA and making a neutral statement does not depend on the alternative of not publicly taking
a position at all. There is reasonable concern that this holds. Lying low and making a neutral statement
might be rather similarly related to unobserved factors. In order to assess the robustness of our results
if the IIA is relaxed, we estimate a nested MNL by grouping the alternatives ‘no opinion recorded’ and
‘undecided’ as well as ‘in favor’ and ‘against’.22
We present the estimated coefficients resulting from the nested MNL model in Table A6 in the
Appendix alongside the estimates from our baseline model presented in Table 3. The estimated coefficients
are qualitatively similar to those in the baseline model. However, they tend to be less precisely measured
than in the baseline analysis. The estimated inclusive value coefficient λˆ indicates that there is moderate
correlation between the error terms within groups.23 The null hypothesis, which posits that the true
model is the standard MNL model (λˆ = 1) can, however, be rejected at the 1 percent significance level.
In order to quantify the effect of campaign contributions on legislators’ positions conditional on the
22 This allows correlation between εnoopinionrecorded and εundecided, as well as between εinfavor and εagainst, but not
between these two groups.
23 1− λˆ measures the approximate correlation among εjs within the same nest.
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Internet service blackout, we again present plots of the computed effects. While the effects based on
the nested model are smaller and less precisely measured than in the standard MNL, the evidence with
respect to our main hypotheses remains qualitatively the same. Figure A10 in the Appendix presents the
computed effects.
Concluding remarks
Technological change challenges established industries. Old and new players pursue strategies beyond
markets and lobby legislatures for a favorable legal environment. Sometimes these factional arguments
are supported by financial contributions that help legislators to fund their electoral campaigns. In this
context, it is still not well understood what factors induce legislators to support specific IG interests.
In our paper, we emphasize public attention to a policy issue as a crucial condition affecting whether
legislators cater more to IGs or to their constituency. We present a simple calculus for the relationship
between the campaign contributions that a legislator receives from a specific IG and his or her support
of a specific policy issue favoring that IG. A stronger positive (statistical) relationship is predicted if the
issue in question is not a salient topic of public interest than if it is.
Our empirical analysis takes up the regulation of an area that is the epitome of change, i.e., the
regulation of the Internet. In this area, the protection of copyright is one specific aspect with conflicting
interests within different industries as well as between some industries and consumers (see, e.g., Lessig
2004). A case in point are two bills introduced in the U.S. Congress in 2011: the Stop Online Piracy
Act (SOPA) and the Protect IP Act (PIPA). They aim at strengthening law enforcement to combat
online copyright infringements and online trafficking in counterfeit goods. Based on our compiled dataset
that includes 598 public statements of Members of Congress regarding SOPA/PIPA, we are able to trace
the policy stance of legislators on the issue over time. The results of our multinomial logit regressions
reveal that the surplus in financial support from the copyright industry (relative to contributions from
the tech industry) predicts the stance that legislators adopt on the two bills up to January 18, 2012. This
is the date when roughly 7,000 web platforms in the United States (including Wikipedia and Google)
temporarily shut down their sites to protest against the two bills. The event substantially increased public
attention on this issue and thus fueled the dynamic of the political discourse. On average, legislators after
the event were more likely to oppose the bills and less likely to publicly support them. More interestingly
and in line with our hypothesis, campaign contributions from the involved industries no longer have
23
predictive power for legislators’ stances on the issue.
The Internet service blackout serves as a quasi-experiment in our analysis, as we are fairly convinced
that the huge increase in public attention surrounding the two bills was unexpected. However, the
event also points to a strategy that some interest groups might use when pursuing their goals, which
Schattschneider (1960) discussed as an expansion of the scope of conflict involving the public.24 The
coordinated action can be understood as lobbying by rousing grassroots. The actors aim to increase the
salience of an issue within the electorate in order to motivate legislators to take potential voter reactions
into account. In such a setting, what are primary policy issues is endogenous and might change between
the introduction of a bill and the final decision on it in parliament. As recognized in the literature on
campaigning, it is difficult to steer the salience that an issue will have with the public. In fact, the
salience of policy issues might be understood as resulting from shocks triggered by some random events
and hyped by the media (and other self-interested actors). As an optimal decision rule, lobbying by
rousing grassroots is unlikely to be a commonly chosen option (as opposed to lobbying legislators). It is
likely to be chosen by IGs who control (part of) the media, and for concerns that are secondary policy
issues and have the potential to become primary policy issues for retrospective voters. There is still a lot
to be learned about exchange in the political sphere.
24 Related work refers to lobbying citizens and outside lobbying (see, e.g., Kollman 1998, Mahoney 2007, and Wolton
2016).
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Appendix
A.I Data appendix
Public statements on the SOPA/PIPA bills
Our data set covers the political debate on the SOPA/PIPA policy issue from September 2010 (the
introduction of the COICA bill, a preliminary version of the PIPA bill, to the U.S. Senate) to the post-
ponement of the SOPA and the PIPA bills in January 2012. Our initial baseline sample was compiled
from ProPublica’s website (http://projects.propublica.org/sopa/timeline.html) and the Sunlight
Foundation’s OpenCongress web platform (https://www.opencongress.org/wiki/Protect_IP_Act_
Senate_whip_count). Note that the final overview of stances published by ProPublica available on
http://projects.propublica.org/sopa/sopa.html turned out to be slightly problematic for research
applications, as we could not find primary sources for all stances coded by ProPublica. We therefore only
use the statements that are explicitly listed in ProPublica’s time-line file, where each stance is clearly
related to a primary source. We then reconciled, extended, and validated the baseline sample with general
web searches and specific searches in media outlets via LexisNexis as well as via Project Votes Smart
(PVS) (www.votesmart.org; i.e., we checked the PVS webpages of each Member of Congress who was in
office during the period of interest for statements). We predominantly employed web scraping techniques
(programmatic information extraction from webpages) to extract the raw data on legislators’ stances.
We provide these scripts for replication purposes on request.
Table A1 presents an excerpt from our data set. The full data set will be provided by the authors
on request. Table A2 summarizes the differences between our own statement coding and the statement
coding of secondary sources.
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Table A2: Differences in statement coding
Secondary source coding
Own coding
Total
Against Undecided
Leaning No 65 5 70
No 0 9 9
Undecided 7 0 7
Yes 1 24 25
Total 73 38 111
In Figure A1, we illustrate the legislators’ last recorded positions with regard to the SOPA/PIPA
bills before and after the Internet service blackout. For each possible combination of positions (in favor,
against, undecided; or no opinion recorded) before and after the blackout, we count the number of
legislators and assign the number to the respective cell in the panel. The number of legislators for each
combination is reflected in the size of the dots. The four combinations on the diagonal (from the top
left-hand to the bottom right-hand cell) capture the legislators who either did not publicly change their
position due to the service blackout or did not make any public statements on the issue.
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Figure A1: Members of Congress’ stances on SOPA/PIPA before and after the service blackout
in favor against undecided no opinion recorded
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Notes: The size of the dots indicates the number of legislators taking the respective stance with regard to the
SOPA/PIPA bill.
Data sources: Own compilation based on various sources. See main text and Section A.I for details.
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Campaign contributions
Figure A2 shows the monthly aggregate flow of money from these two industries to the members of the
112th U.S. Congress between February 2010 and February 2014. The underlying time period considered
in the plot includes two years before and two years after the Internet service blackout on January 18,
2012. The two vertical dashed lines indicate the beginning and end of the observation period in our main
analysis. The black dot-dashed line indicates the date of the Internet service blackout. The monthly
aggregate contributions peak during the last months of the election years (2010 and 2012).
Figure A2: Aggregate campaign finance contributions to U.S. legislators prior to and after the service blackout
Internet service blackout
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Note: The time period depicted includes two years before and two years after the service blackout.
Data sources: Center for Responsive Politics/OpenSecrets.org and Sunlight Foundation (see Section A.I for de-
tails).
Contributions to supporters and opponents of SOPA/PIPA
Figure A3 depicts the legislators’ last stances before the service blackout in relation to the natural
logarithm of the aggregate campaign contributions they received from the two industries over the year
prior to the service blackout. Many legislators received substantial contributions from both industries.
However, most supporters of the bills clearly got more money from the copyright industry. Figure A4
compares campaign contributions by the two industries to (co-)sponsors of the bills. Sponsors and co-
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Figure A3: Public statements on SOPA/PIPA and financial support by industry
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Notes: The natural logarithm of copyright-industry contributions received by individual legislators up to a year
before the Internet service blackout is plotted against the natural logarithm of tech-industry contributions. The
shape of the dots indicates the legislators’ stances on SOPA/PIPA. The natural logarithm of contributions of USD
0 is not defined and has been set to 0.
Data sources: Center for Responsive Politics/OpenSecrets.org, Sunlight Foundation, and ProPublica.
sponsors received on average more campaign contributions from the copyright industry.
Descriptive statistics
Table A3: Descriptive statistics
Statistic N Mean St. Dev. Min Max
∆ Contributions (USD 1,000) 534 3.607 31.286 −428.799 275.110
Republican 534 0.541 0.499 0 1
Age 534 58.310 10.855 30.562 88.044
Years served 534 11.760 9.779 1 58
Male 534 0.831 0.375 0 1
Note: The difference is defined as contributions from the copyright industry minus those from the tech industry.
Data sources: Own compilation based on various sources. See above for details.
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Figure A4: Average campaign contributions to (co-)sponsors of the SOPA/PIPA bills
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Note: Contributions refer to those received within the year prior to the blackout.
Data sources: Center for Responsive Politics/OpenSecrets.org, Sunlight Foundation, and ProPublica.
35
A.II Results
Figure A5: Kernel density of differences in campaign contributions (copyright industry minus tech industry) for
supporters and opponents of SOPA/PIPA
Before the internet service blackout
After the internet service blackout
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Notes: The two samples contain the monthly differences in campaign finance contributions from the copyright
industry and the tech industry to legislators who took a stance in favor of SOPA/PIPA or against SOPA/PIPA,
respectively. The sample used in the first plot in the top graph covers monthly differences back to one year before
January 18, 2012. The sample used in the plot in the bottom graph covers monthly differences up to one year after
January 18, 2012.
Data sources: Center for Responsive Politics/OpenSecrets.org, Sunlight Foundation.
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A.III Internet Blackout and attention on SOPA/PIPA
Figure A6: Google search interests with respect to SOPA/PIPA two years around the Internet service blackout
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Notes: Weekly search interest for terms related to major legislation introduced and debated during the 112th U.S.
Congress. The search interest index provided by Google is defined as (no. of queries for search term in week
i)/(Total no. of queries in week i). The computed index is then normalized by the maximum index value within
the respective time range. RFMA refers to the Respect for Marriage Act (S. 598, H.R. 1116). The search term
‘Obamacare’ relates to the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA) which passed Congress in 2010.
However, during the 112th Congress, the Repealing the Job-Killing Health Care Law Act (H.R. 2), an attempt to
repeal PPACA was debated in Congress. The term ‘Obamacare’ is searched more often during the 112th congress
than the original terms ‘PPACA’ and ‘Job-Killing Health Care Law Act’, which is why we present the results
for ‘Obamacare’ as a reference point to searches on SOPA/PIPA. Other major bills proposed during the 112th
Congress were the American Jobs Act (S. 1549), the Cut, Cap, and Balance Act (H.R. 2560), the Federal Reserve
Transparency Act (S. 202 H.R. 459), and the No Taxpayer Funding for Abortion Act (H.R. 3). Neither the popular
names of these bills nor their widely used abbreviations (if any) were searched more often than the terms related
to bills presented in this figure.
Data source: Google Trends (www.google.com/trends/).
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A.IV Robustness checks
Figure A7: Percentage of individual type 15 donations by copyright/tech industry employees per electoral district
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(c) House: copyright industry
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Notes: Electoral district industry structure captured by individual type 15 donations in % of all individual type 15
donations per electoral district. All type 15 donations are first filtered for individual donors. The donors’ addresses
are then geocoded via the Street Address to Coordinates API (Warden 2013) and the coordinates mapped to the
official congressional election districts. The variables are then computed for each district as the percentage of all
donations made by individuals working in the respective industry (i.e., tech or copyright). The maps indicate in
which quartile of these percentages a district is.
Data source: Center for Responsive Politics/OpenSecrets.org, Sunlight Foundation, and U.S. Census Bureau (con-
gressional district maps).
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Table A4: MNL estimates of stated stances on SOPA/PIPA with control for industry structure
Dependent variable:
Undecided Against In favor Undecided Against In favor
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
∆ Contributions (USD 1,000) 0.016∗∗∗ −0.027∗∗∗ 0.029∗∗∗ 0.015∗∗ −0.027∗∗∗ 0.023∗∗
(0.006) (0.003) (0.009) (0.007) (0.004) (0.011)
After 1.395∗∗∗ 2.429∗∗∗ −2.333∗∗∗ 1.371∗∗∗ 2.443∗∗∗ −2.358∗∗∗
(0.360) (0.233) (0.402) (0.364) (0.241) (0.442)
∆ Contributions (USD 1,000) x after −0.017∗∗ 0.030∗∗∗ −0.027∗∗ −0.019∗∗ 0.028∗∗∗ −0.025∗∗
(0.008) (0.006) (0.010) (0.009) (0.006) (0.012)
Republican 0.281 −0.156 −0.258
(0.305) (0.199) (0.343)
Male −0.720∗ 0.109 −0.119
(0.380) (0.253) (0.420)
Age 0.028 −0.017 0.016
(0.018) (0.012) (0.020)
Years served 0.011 −0.009 −0.017
(0.019) (0.013) (0.022)
Senator (PIPA) 2.206∗∗∗ 0.985∗∗∗ 2.500∗∗∗
(0.396) (0.265) (0.471)
Copyright industry (%) 0.088 0.116∗ 0.115 0.090 0.145∗∗ 0.171
(0.120) (0.069) (0.215) (0.131) (0.073) (0.246)
Copyright industry (%) x after −0.133 −0.271∗∗ −0.015 −0.130 −0.274∗∗ 0.011
(0.175) (0.122) (0.238) (0.189) (0.126) (0.271)
Tech industry (%) 0.451∗∗∗ 0.323∗∗∗ 0.091 0.462∗∗∗ 0.323∗∗∗ 0.042
(0.113) (0.067) (0.182) (0.111) (0.071) (0.197)
Tech industry (%) x after −0.485∗∗∗ −0.346∗∗∗ −0.330 −0.548∗∗∗ −0.341∗∗∗ −0.480∗∗
(0.171) (0.112) (0.212) (0.164) (0.119) (0.230)
Constant −3.207∗∗∗ −2.628∗∗∗ −2.156∗∗∗ −5.188∗∗∗ −1.750∗∗∗ −3.383∗∗∗
(0.249) (0.155) (0.314) (1.030) (0.661) (1.133)
N 1068 1068 1068 1068 1068 1068
Akaike Inf. Crit. 1,890.628 1,890.628 1,890.628 1,765.885 1,765.885 1,765.885
Notes: The difference in contributions is computed by subtracting the total amount of contributions that a legislator
received from the tech industry over a period of one year prior to the Internet service blackout from the total amount
received from the copyright industry over the same period of time. The sample contains two observations per
member of Congress, i.e., the last recorded opinions before and after the Internet service blackout. The alternative
‘no opinion recorded’ serves as the reference category (the respective coefficients are normalized to 0, and are
not shown in the table). Standard errors are presented in parentheses. The statistical significance of regression
coefficients is indicated with * 0.1 > p > 0.05, ** 0.05 > p > 0.01, and *** p < 0.001.
Data sources: Own compilation from various sources. See Section A.I for details.
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Table A5: Separate (before/after) MNL estimates for stated stances on SOPA/PIPA
Dependent variable:
Undecided Against In favor Undecided Against In favor
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
∆ Contributions (USD 1,000) 0.006 −0.038∗∗∗ 0.021∗∗∗ −0.004 −0.0002 0.008
(0.010) (0.009) (0.007) (0.004) (0.003) (0.016)
Republican 0.003 −0.603∗ −0.288 0.320 −0.033 −9.170∗∗∗
(0.418) (0.346) (0.316) (0.373) (0.201) (0.0002)
Male −0.661 −0.294 −0.241 −0.808∗ 0.236 7.695∗∗∗
(0.489) (0.422) (0.394) (0.418) (0.265) (1.889)
Age 0.046∗ −0.023 0.022 0.020 −0.015 −0.061
(0.028) (0.021) (0.020) (0.024) (0.012) (0.102)
Years served 0.019 0.003 −0.018 −0.0001 −0.015 0.090
(0.025) (0.024) (0.021) (0.024) (0.013) (0.087)
Senator (PIPA) 1.819∗∗∗ 1.344∗∗∗ 2.315∗∗∗ 2.353∗∗∗ 0.882∗∗∗ 11.247∗∗∗
(0.434) (0.408) (0.330) (0.383) (0.271) (1.888)
Constant −5.534∗∗∗ −0.597 −3.276∗∗∗ −3.372∗∗ 0.403 −18.044∗∗∗
(1.563) (1.118) (1.110) (1.328) (0.670) (1.882)
Sample Before Before Before After After After
N 534 534 534 534 534 534
Akaike Inf. Crit. 821.146 821.146 821.146 962.437 962.437 962.437
Notes: The difference in contributions is computed by subtracting the total amount of contributions that a legislator
received from the tech industry over a period of one year prior to the Internet service blackout from the total amount
received from the copyright industry over the same period of time.
Data sources: See main text and Section A.I.
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Figure A8: Campaign contributions and publicly stated stances before the Internet blackout
Difference in campaign contributions in USD 1,000
(TV/Movie/Music vs. Computer/Internet)
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Notes: Effect plots based on the first estimated multinomial logit model in Table A5. The y-axis depicts the
estimated probability of observing a legislator taking one of the alternative positions on the SOPA/PIPA bills
before the Internet blackout. The dashed lines display a 95-percent confidence interval around the estimated
effects.
Data sources: See Section A.I.
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Figure A9: Campaign contributions and publicly stated stances after the Internet blackout
Difference in campaign contributions in USD 1,000
(TV/Movie/Music vs. Computer/Internet)
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Notes: Effect plots based on the second estimated multinomial logit model in Table A5. The y-axis depicts the
estimated probability of observing a legislator taking one of the alternative positions on the SOPA/PIPA bills after
the Internet blackout. The dashed lines display a 95-percent confidence interval around the estimated effects.
Data sources: See Section A.I.
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Table A6: Separate (before/after) MNL estimates: alternative money specification
Dependent variable:
Undecided Against In favor Undecided Against In favor
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Copyright Contributions (USD 1,000) 0.007 −0.029∗∗ 0.022∗∗∗ −0.011 −0.003 0.024
(0.009) (0.013) (0.008) (0.008) (0.004) (0.032)
Tech Contributions (USD 1,000) 0.006 0.040∗∗∗ −0.018 −0.00004 −0.004 −0.133
(0.012) (0.010) (0.014) (0.008) (0.005) (0.153)
Republican −0.008 −0.603∗ −0.290 0.292 −0.039 −11.702∗∗∗
(0.419) (0.348) (0.317) (0.374) (0.201) (0.0001)
Male −0.604 −0.261 −0.242 −0.895∗∗ 0.196 5.922∗∗∗
(0.493) (0.428) (0.395) (0.422) (0.266) (1.951)
Age 0.051∗ −0.022 0.023 0.017 −0.017 −0.087
(0.028) (0.021) (0.020) (0.024) (0.012) (0.101)
Years served 0.015 0.003 −0.019 0.003 −0.013 0.084
(0.025) (0.024) (0.021) (0.024) (0.014) (0.089)
Senator (PIPA) 1.704∗∗∗ 1.308∗∗∗ 2.293∗∗∗ 2.526∗∗∗ 1.006∗∗∗ 13.776∗∗∗
(0.445) (0.414) (0.337) (0.396) (0.285) (1.924)
Constant −5.916∗∗∗ −0.768 −3.352∗∗∗ −2.986∗∗ 0.580 −16.144∗∗∗
(1.601) (1.138) (1.140) (1.351) (0.682) (1.923)
Sample Before Before Before After After After
N 534 534 534 534 534 534
Akaike Inf. Crit. 824.765 824.765 824.765 961.940 961.940 961.940
Notes: Contributions (in USD 1,000) are the total amount of contributions that a legislator received from either
industry over a period of one year prior to the Internet service blackout.
Data sources: See main text and Section A.I.
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Table A7: Nested MNL estimates of stated stances on SOPA/PIPA before and after the Internet service blackout
Dependent variable:
Undecided Against In favor Undecided Against In favor
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
∆ Contributions 0.006 -0.039 *** 0.022 *** 0.001 -0.030 *** 0.017 ***
(USD 1,000) (0.010) (0.009) (0.007) (0.004) (0.009) (0.006)
After 0.583 ** 1.886 *** -2.764 *** 0.267 * 1.414 *** -0.780
(0.270) (0.192) (0.639) (0.156) (0.222) (0.693)
∆ Contributions -0.010 0.038 *** -0.019 -0.002 0.030 *** -0.017
(USD 1,000) × After (0.011) (0.010) (0.016) (0.005) (0.010) (0.017)
Republican 0.175 -0.170 -0.320 0.098 -0.193 -0.302
(0.277) (0.173) (0.305) (0.143) (0.160) (0.224)
Male -0.762 ** 0.100 -0.132 -0.356 * 0.091 0.130
(0.314) (0.226) (0.383) (0.200) (0.209) (0.321)
Age 0.031 * -0.016 0.018 0.014 -0.014 0.007
(0.018) (0.010) (0.019) (0.010) (0.010) (0.015)
Years served 0.009 -0.010 -0.014 0.004 -0.012 -0.014
(0.017) (0.012) (0.020) (0.009) (0.011) (0.015)
Senator (PIPA) 2.128 *** 0.960 *** 2.417 *** 0.963 ** 0.922 *** 1.826 ***
(0.284) (0.225) (0.314) (0.382) (0.194) (0.323)
Constant -4.599 *** -1.308 ** -3.220 *** -2.102 ** -0.958 * -2.394 ***
(1.005) (0.578) (1.068) (0.914) (0.544) (0.889)
Model MNL MNL MNL Nested MNL Nested MNL Nested MNL
N 1068 1068 1068 1068 1068 1068
1− λˆ 0.549 0.549 0.549
T-test: λˆ = 1 (p-value) 0.001 0.001 0.001
Akaike Inf. Crit. 1773.751 1773.751 1773.751 1771.626 1771.626 1771.626
Notes: The difference in contributions is computed by subtracting the total amount of contributions a legislator
received from the tech industry over a period of one year prior to the Internet service blackout from the total
amount received from the copyright industry over the same period of time. The sample contains two observations
per Member of Congress, i.e., the last recorded opinions before and after the Internet service blackout. The
alternative ‘No opinion recorded’ serves as reference category (the respective coefficients are normalized to 0, and
are not shown in the table). Standard errors are presented in parentheses. The statistical significance of regression
coefficients is indicated with * 0.1 > p > 0.05, ** 0.05 > p > 0.01, and *** p < 0.001.
Data sources: See main text and Section A.I.
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Figure A10: Campaign contributions and publicly stated stances based on the nested MNL
Difference in campaign contributions in USD 1,000
(copyright minus tech−industry)
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Notes: Effect plots based on the estimated multinomial logit model in Table A7, columns 4 to 6. The y-axis depicts
the estimated probability of observing a legislator taking one of the alternative positions on the SOPA/PIPA bills.
The dashed lines display a 95-percent confidence interval around the estimated effects.
Data sources: See Section A.I.
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